ETHNICITY AND FINANCIAL EXCLUSION:
HOW FRINGE B ANKING HAS TAKEN HOLD IN
ETHNIC AND IMMIGRANT NEIGHB ORHOODS

Marie- Christine Pauwels
University of Paris Ouest Nanterre la Defense, France

In neighborhoods mostly peopled by low-income groups , ethnic mi
norities and immigrant communities, access to regular bank services is
often difficult and fraught with many obstacles . When they need a short
term loan, many of these customers will fall back on alternative financial
services and visit either a payday lender, a pawnshop, a check-cashing
outlet, a rent-to-own store or another similar kind of business.
This alternative or "fringe banking" sector has been developing and
consolidating rapidly over the past two decades and its rate of growth is
spectacular: in 2009, there were almost 23 ,000 payday lenders nation
wide against a mere 200 in the early nineties . Likewise, the number of
pawnshops almost tripled between 1 985 and 2006, climbing from 4,500
to almost 1 2,000. In 2008, the Brookings Institution listed 48,000 of
these non-bank establishments, versus slightly over 1 00,000 bank and
credit union branches, and the number of online transactions is booming
(estimates reckon that by 20 1 6, 60% of total payday loans will take place
online against 3 5 % in 20 1 1 ) . 1
One of the first to draw national attention to the size of this parallel
economy was economist John Caskey in 1 995 with his book Fringe
Banking, which was followed ten years later by social policy analyst
Howard Karger' s Shortchanged: Life & Debt in the Fringe Economy
(2005) . Since then, a whole body of literature on the topic has emerged,
denouncing both the usurious and discriminatory practices of this sector
but also the failure of regular banks to draw these customers back into
their fold.
In 2009, the FDIC released its "National Survey of Unbanked and
Underbanked2 Households", the first of its kind to analyze on a national
scale those households who fall through the cracks of the mainstream
1 Daniel Brook, Harper's Magazine, April 2009, p.43 ; Brookings Institution, "B anking
on Wealth: America' s New Retail B anking Infrastructure and Its Wealth-Building Potential",
January 2008; "Major Banks Aid in Payday Loans B anned by States", New York Times, Febru
ary 23 20 1 3 .
2 The underbanked are people who have a checking or saving account but use non-bank
money orders, check cashing services, payday loans, etc . at least once a year.
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banking system.3 Its findings, later confirmed in a follow-up study for
20 1 1 -20 1 2 (which showed a worsening picture, +0.6% in the proportion
of unbanked households, and + 1 .9% for the underbanked) were quite dis
tressing (figure 1 ) :
>

25.6% of U . S . households, about 30 million, are ei
ther unbanked (9 million) or underbanked (2 1 mil
lion), i.e. more than 60 million adults . These
households have no or little relationship with a bank,
savings institution, credit union, or any other main
stream financial service provider.

>

Minority populations are disproportionately repre
sented since almost 54% of black households are ei
ther unbanked ( 22% ) or underbanked (32%), while
43 . 3 % of Hispanic households and 44.5 % of Ameri
can Indian!Alaskan households fall into this cate
gory. The figure for white households is of 1 8%
only.

>

Households where Spanish is the only language spo
ken at home are also more likely to be unbanked
(35 .6%), as are households where the householder is
a foreign-born noncitizen (2 1 .9%)

>

In a number of areas, particularly in the South re
gion, estimated minority unbanked and underbanked
proport i o n s s u b s tantially exceed the national
estimate.

>

Last but not least, a substantial proportion of unbanked households were previously banked.

This survey confirmed previous findings, in particular the 2004 Working
Paper from the Joint Center for Housing Studies at Harvard University
which had already pointed out that the "unbanked" were overwhelmingly
African-American and Hispanic, less educated, less affluent and younger
than the population as a whole.4
Taking a look at the reasons given by these households for being
unbanked or underbanked is very instructive :
3 FDIC National Survey of Unbanked and Underbanked Households, December 2009,
http ://www.fdic.gov/householdsurvey/full_report.pdf; see also the 2 0 1 1 survey, http ://www.
fdic.gov/householdsurveyI20 1 2_unbankedreport.pdf; and Howard Karger, "America' s Grow
ing Fringe Economy", Dollars & Sense November/December 2006 ; Howard Karger, "The
Modern Fringe Economy", The Social Policy Journal, vol. 3 ( 1 ) 2004 ; and The Unbanked, fact
sheet, University of Minnesota, 2006.
4 Christopher Barry, "To Bank or Not to Bank? A Survey of Low-Income Households",
Joint Center for Housing Studies Working Paper Series, BABC 04- 3 . February 2004 .
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FIGURE 1 . COMPARISON OF UNBANKED AND UNDERBANKED
HOUSEHOLDS BY RACE AND ETHNICITY
Percentage of Households
_ Unbanked

40.0

I=:J Underbanked
- Unbanked National Estimate

35.0

-

Underbanked National Estimate

30.0

25.0

20.0

1 5 .0

1 0 .0

5.0

0.0

Black

Hispanic

American Hawaiian!Pacific
Isl ander
Indian!Alaskan

Asian

>

37% say they don ' t have enough money to need an
account

>

1 8 % don ' t write enough checks
1 2% complain the minimum balance requirement is

>

White

too high
>

1 2% do not need or want an account! did not see
value of an account

>

9% say banks do not feel comfortable or welcoming
6.9% complain of language barriers
6 . 3 % do not trust banks
5 . 5 % have a legal status problem, or are unable to

>
>
>

provide required residency documentation
Most of these factors reveal a deep disconnect with mainstream banks,
and speak of a profound distrust toward businesses perceived as essen
tially catering to well-off and savvy customers. The unbanked over
whelmingly consider banks as hostile environments, ill-adapted to their
needs and untrustworthy. In a 2004 Homeownership Alliance study of
barriers to banking for Latin Americans, U . S . banks were called insecure,
unsafe, unforgiving, unwelcoming, inflexible, and intimidating environ
ments with language barriers . The same study suggested that more His
panics would open bank accounts if the matricula consular card was
more easily accepted for identification, if banks were flexible in mini-
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mum balance expectations, and if remittance rates were reasonably
priced.
There is a great deal of self-censorship also: many unbanked people
have simply integrated the notion that they don ' t need or deserve a bank
account, let alone a credit which they fear will be rejected anyway . Other
research on perceptions of creditworthiness reveals that African Ameri
cans in particular tend to be overly pessimistic about their credit scores,
and are convinced they needn ' t bother ask a prime lender for a loan,
because it will almost certainly be denied.
The alternative, then, is to turn to alternative financial services, aka
fringe banking . Over 60% of unbanked households regularly visit a pay
day outlet, a check-cashing store, a pawnshop, and other similar busi
nesses when they need to borrow small amounts of money and get cash
fast. And what appears very clearly is that these fringe businesses have
developed proactive, deliberate strategies of expansion toward ethnic and
immigrant communities . There is indeed a disproportionate number of
these outlets in relation to regular bank agencies in areas with large con
centrations of minority and immigrant communities. 5
In 2005 , 2008 and 2009, the Center for Responsible Lending carried
out three studies on payday lender locations in several states - North
Carolina, Arizona, Texas and California. All three reached the same con
clusions : minority neighborhoods (defined by the census tracts, i.e. areas
comprising between 2,500 and 8,000 people), especially those with large
African American, Latino, or Native American popUlations, were found
to have three to eight times as many payday lending stores per capita as
white neighborhoods (table 1 ) . In California, while African Americans,
Latinos, and Native Americans make up about a third (3 5 % ) of the adult
population, they represent 56% of all payday borrowers. In Texas,
Blacks and Hispanics represent 40% of the adult population, yet 77% of
all payday borrowers . 6 It is undeniable that race and ethnicity were dom
inant factors in the decision of these fringe banks to settle in these
neighborhoods .
One interesting finding is that even when both mainstream banks
and fringe banking outlets co-exist in the same neighborhoods - which
means these customers therefore have a choice - the unbankedlun
derbanked often deliberately choose the fringe banking outlets over the

5 Mark L. Burkey and Scott P. Simkins, "Factors Affecting the Location of Payday
Lending and Traditional Banking Services in North Carolina" Review of Regional Studies, vol.
34 no. 2, Fall 2004, p . 1 9 l -205 ; Assaf Oron, "Easy Prey: Evidence for Race and Military
Related Targeting in the Distribution of Payday Loan Branches in Washington State", Depart
ment of Statistics, University of Washington, March 2006.
6 Wealth-Stripping Payday Loans Trouble Communities of Color, Center for Responsi
ble Lending October 2, 2008.
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TABLE 1
COMMUNITIES OF COLOR MAKE UP HIGHER PROPERTIONS OF
BORROWERS IN CALIFORNIA AND TEXAS
California

Texas

% of total

% of total

% of total

% of total

payday
borrowers

adult
population

payday
borrowers

adult
population

African American

18%

6%

43 %

1 1%

Latino

36%

28%

34%

29%

2%

<1%

Native American

Not available

regular mainstream banks .7 Why is that so? Four main reasons can be
identified:
>

>

Speedy and convenient transactions. Fringe outlets
often act as one-stop shopping centers which offer
all sorts of commercial services unavailable at the
local bank. At a check-cashing outlet for instance,
aside from cashing checks, one can also pay utility
bills, transfer money for remittances8, place money
orders, buy prepaid long distance calling cards, cell
phones and beepers, send and receive a fax, xerox
documents, buy postage stamps, envelopes, lottery
tickets or even keep a mailbox.
Easy-to-get loans. To get a payday loan, almost any
one with a checking account and source of income
gets approved, even with a poor FICO score (under
650) ; lenders usually do not conduct credit checks .
The only paperwork required is a form asking con-

7 John Caskey, "B ank Representation in Low-Income and Minority Urban Communi
ties", Urban Affairs Review, vo1.29, 1 994, p.6 1 7 . The author who studied this pattern from
1 970 to 1 989 in five different cities (Atlanta, Denver, New York, S an Jose, Washington D . C . )
reports that in all fi v e cities, areas with a dominant African-American or Hispanic population
are substantially less likely to have a local bank compared to other communities but contends
that this underrepresentation does not necessarily mean banks deliberately avoid minority ar
eas. Low housing value/ lack of business activity can explain it; see also the National Commu
nity Reinvestment Coalition, "Are B anks on the Map ? An Analysis of B ank Branch Location
in Working Class and Minority Neighborhoods", 2007 ; and "Predatory Profiling : The Role of
Race and Ethnicity in the Location of Payday Lenders in California", Center for Responsible
Lending, March 26, 2009.
8 A large portion of these transactions does not occur through formal financial institu
tions. Rather than relying on traditional banks, many immigrants in the United States turn to
smaller banks and credit unions, private money-transfer services and personal networks to
send money to friends and relatives in their native country. 70-80% percent of immigrants use
wire transfer agencies such as Western Union and Moneygram to send money to friends and
relatives in their home country.
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tact information about the customer, his/her spouse,
landlord or mortgage holder, and three acquaint
ances . Applicants fill out the form, show proof of
employment or another source of income such as So
cial Security, give their bank account number, and
write a postdated check, dated to their next payday,
for the loan amount plus the fee . It takes half an hour
against several days at the bank. It is a form of fast
food banking.
>

Simplicity : pricing for these short-term loans is de
ceptively simple. For a payday loan, a fixed interest
rate of around $ 1 5 to $20 is charged for each $ 1 00
amount borrowed for a two-week loan, and there are
no additional charges if the loan is paid back on
time. It' s easy to understand and the cash is available
on the spot.

>

Personalized attention, friendly clerks and respect of
sales personnel, trained to make these customers feel
welcome and who are taught to empathize, the "we
understand what you ' re going through" approach.
Fringe banking sells itself as credit with a human
face, contrary to the dehumanizing banks.

Many of the reasons people use these services are not linked to cost. The
fringe banking system exists because it addresses a real need, which
banks fail to do. These businesses pitch themselves as helping communi
ties in need, and performing a necessary service which no other business
cares to offer. In a sense, they are right. They have managed to gain the
trust of these customers who choose to visit them, even though it may not
be in their best interest.
No wonder retail giants are stepping on the bandwagon: Wal-Mart,
which already had 1 ,800 "MoneyCenters" inside its U . S . stores , where
shoppers can cash checks, transfer money, buy the WalMart prepaid
debit card (the MoneyCard) for only $3 (and no overdraft fees) added
500 more in 20 1 0 .
Meanwhile, the real cost o f these credit products is astronomical .
Asking for a $300 payday loan for example, which comes with a 1 5 % to
20% interest rate for a two-week period means writing a check for $360,
which amounts to annualized interest rates (APR or annual percentage
rate) of over 400 percent. Because these loans are short-term, involve
small amounts and are simple to get, most borrowers fail to appreciate
how expensive they really are. They don ' t understand the difference be
tween a percentage rate applied on a two-week loan and the percentage
rate calculated over an entire year. The payday lending industry is a
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predatory industry that takes advantage of this assymetric information
between borrowers and lenders . Even more disheartening, those who do
know they are getting ripped off feel they have no other solution. What
matters to people who live paycheck to paycheck is how much they are
going to be paying weekly and whether they can afford it. Long-term
strategies are not even an option, and fringe banking thrives on this sense
of urgency.
The perversity of the system is that, unlike what the business wants
us to believe, this service is not designed to help someone in trouble get
an emergency one-time fix ; instead, it is designed to keep the borrowers
in a cycle of permanent debt. Research has shown that after the two
week period, most borrowers are unable to pay back their initial loan, but
instead roll it over into a new one, then a third, all the while paying the
outlandish $ 1 5 or $20 finance fees each time. Only 25 % of borrowers
eventually manage to pay off. Meanwhile the average customer takes
about ten payday loans a year.
The loan is structured as a trap. Some customers, to save face, take
out a loan from another payday lender to pay the first and end up with
multiple lenders to keep track of. The Center for Responsible Lending
has found that 90 percent of business is generated by borrowers with five
or more loans a year and over 60 percent of business is generated by
borrowers with 12 or more loans a year.9 Payday loan losses are about
6% or less. A customer who pays off a loan or purchases a good or
service outright is much less profitable than customers who keep re
turning for another loan. Most of the profit in the fringe economy lies
with keeping customers caught in an expensive web of debt. Clearly ,
those who use these services have evolved from occasional users to
chronic borrowers and payday lending has become a form of twenty
first century sharecropping. 1 0
The other most popular fringe banking services are offered by
pawnshops , car title loans, tax refund anticipation loans and rent-to-own
stores. Pawnshops offer small, short-term loans with personal items, such
as jewelry or large electronics , as collateral. The average pawnshop loan
is about $75 but can go as low as $ 1 5 . Interests are as high as 25 percent.
Loopholes in state usury laws often allow them to rollover fees and fi
nance charges also. The pawnshop collects the item if the borrower de
faults on his payment. Pawnshops are less popular in comparison to
9

Wealth-Stripping Payday Loans Trouble Communities of Color, op.cit.
Payday lending is legal and regulated in 37 states. It was first authorized in 1 996. In
Georgia, North Carolina and 1 1 other states, it is either illegal or not feasible, given state law.
Yet most of the regulatory efforts to police the sector have been ineffective so far: customers
simply take back-to-back transactions when renewing the loan immediately is not allowed, and
cooling-off periods to prevent roll overs are totally artificial as borrowers still take a new loan
after a few days.
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payday lenders today because there is no need to leave personal posses
sions as collateral. Yet, payday loans can inflict potentially greater dam
age on borrowers . For instance, if a consumer abandons a pawned item,
the lender retains the collateral and the borrower is not pursued. No re
port is filed with a collection agency nor is the borrower' s credit history
blemished. On the other hand, defaulting on a payday loan will taint the
creditworthiness of the borrower, if not destroy it. These businesses have
evolved into a multi-service industry ; some also provide payday loans
and other financial services. There were 4,500 pawnshops in the United
States in 1 985 ; in 2006 they had grown to almost 1 2,000, including out
lets owned by five publicly traded chains . ! 1
Car title loans are a variation of the typical pawn loan. A person
who owns his/her car can take out a small loan, usually around 2 5 % of
the value of the car, using the car title as collateral. Repayment is usually
made over a number of monthly payments, and interest rates are typically
up to 20% per month. Car title loan contracts are set up so the lender can
collect the car if the borrower defaults, even on only one payment. Un
like pawnshop transactions, the consumer does not forego the use of his
property during the course of the loan, even though the vehicle is techni
cally owned by the lender until the loan is repaid.
Tax refund anticipation loans (RALs) are short-term loans secured
by an expected tax refund. RALs are also expensive and similar to other
forms of fringe credit with an APR which can range from 67 to over
700% percent. Of the several million taxpayers who receive RALs, al
most half get them through H&R B lock, the largest tax preparer in the
nation (Jackson Hewitt is second) . RALs are common in low-income
neighborhoods, due to tax refunds under the federal EITC program.
Since taxpayers must file a federal income tax form to receive an EITC
refund, many use tax preparers and are thus able to get their hands on
their EITC refund more quickly, unaware that they are in fact getting a
predatory loan, basically borrowing their own money and paying high
interest rates for it.
Finally, Rent-to-own Stores are outlets that offer credit to consum
ers to purchase large appliances, electronics, and furniture. Consumers
agree to a series of weekly or monthly payments, but usually end up
paying back two to three times the retail amount of the item. However,
they don ' t own the product in full until the final payment, and if they
default on their payments , the product must be returned and the con
sumer is not compensated. Customers are thus hit with excessive interest
rates, exceedingly high fees, or exorbitant prices for services or goods
they end up paying two to three times as much as if they ' d paid the retail
11

EZ Pawn, Cash America Pawn, Express Cash, Famous Pawn and First Cash Pawn.
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price upfront. "According to the Consumer Federation of America, cus
tomers with RTO contracts pay between $ 1 ,000 and $2,400 for a TV,
stereo, or other maj or appliance worth as little as $200 used, and seldom
more than $600 new ." 1 2
CONCLUSION
Whether one patronizes a payday lender, a pawnshop, a check-cash
ing outlet, or get a tax refund loan from a tax preparer like H&R B lock or
Jackson Hewitt, which is basically a way of borrowing one ' s own
money and pay high interest rates for it, all these examples point to a
similar business model: taking advantage of vulnerable, misinformed,
sometimes helpless customers, many of whom are ethnic minority cus
tomers, and offering them predatory credit services, while pretending to
be performing a form of community service and acting as much needed
substitutes for an inadequate and faulty banking system. The ultimate
irony is that for many of these fringe banking customers, these short-term
loans may in fact be the cheapest option available, compared with the
sometimes prohibitive overdraft protection fees offered by regular banks,
or the astronomical credit card fees.
In spite of existing legislation such as the Community Reinvestment
Act of 1 977 which mandated that federally insured banks meet the credit
needs of their entire communities, including low-income people, and
thus prevent the redlining process, segregation in the credit market, far
from disappearing, has intensified, because the American banking indus
try has become polarized between regular banks in the top tier of the
system who cater to the wealthier and less risky customers, and a flour
ishing market of second and third tier outlets which practice usury lend
ing and take advantage of the more vulnerable. We could describe what
is taking place today as a form of redlining in reverse, one that still dis
criminates against poor communities, only this time not by excluding
them from credit, but by offering instead quick, easy, convenient access
to plenty of credit products which tum out to be scandalously expensive
and which ensnare them into a debt trap. This is not the way ethnic mi
norities are going to build up equity. These communities don ' t have ac
cess to the safe, mainstream and asset-building kind of credit, and are
steered toward the exploitative options instead. In the words of Howard
Karger: "one set of rules for the rich, another set of nonrules for the
poor" . 1 3 Meanwhile, the racial gap in access to fair credit continues
unabated.

1 2 Howard Karger, Shortchanged, Life and Debt in the Fringe Economy, Berrett-Koehler
Publishers, 2005 . p.96.
1 3 id. p.xi.

